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A B S T R A C T   
Past research on foreign divestment has recognized the impact of economic and political differences1. However, 
the prior findings remain equivocal. We adopt the Positive Organizational Scholarship perspective to provide 
more contextualized insights into the effects of economic and political differences on foreign divestment. Spe-
cifically, we consider the juxtaposition of national differences and levels of firm interaction with the different 
contexts. Thus, we develop the concept of friction to assess levels of economic and political differences. We 
further argue that economic friction will have a curvilinear (U-shaped) effect on foreign divestment, whereas 
political friction will produce a monotonic (positive) effect. Moreover, we introduce ownership level as a 
moderator into the main hypotheses. Drawing on data from 2400 foreign subsidiaries of 310 Finnish multina-
tional enterprises, from 1970–2010, we provide support for our main hypotheses, although the moderating effect 
of ownership levels is not supported. We further compare the effects of differences measured by friction with 
those measured by distance. Accordingly, our research highlights the importance of detecting specific conditions 
for the investigation of the impact of economic and political differences in the foreign divestment literature.   
1. Introduction 
Stora Enso, a Finnish MNE and leading global provider of renewable 
solutions, planned to sell its Sachsen Mill, located in Eilenburg, Ger-
many, to Model Group, a Swiss company. Later, Stora Enso announced it 
was to close its paper factory in Sweden (Stora Enso, 2021). These two 
cases are among hundreds of instances of foreign divestment (FD) over 
the past few years, referring to the exit of an active foreign subsidiary of 
a multinational enterprise (MNE) from the host country (Boddewyn, 
1979, 1983), via sell-off (first case) or closure (second case) (Konara & 
Ganotakis, 2020; Sartor & Beamish, 2020). Nevertheless, this striking 
business phenomenon has received scant scholarly attention (Arte & 
Larimo, 2019; Coudounaris, Orero-Blat & Rodríguez-García, 2020; 
Schmid & Morschett, 2020). 
Economic and political differences have profound effects on the 
performance and survival rate of MNEs, that is, providing institutional 
arbitrage and conveying an important source of uncertainty for MNEs 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Gaur & Lu, 2007; Berry, Guillen & Zhou, 
2010; Sartor & Beamish, 2020). Economic and political differences, 
which may be grouped as formal differences or regulatory differences 
(Scott, 1995; Gaur & Lu, 2007), refer to those between countries (Berry 
et al., 2010). The prior research has paid considerable attention to the 
influences of economic and political differences to provide knowledge 
on how MNEs should deal with the differences (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008; Kostova, Beugelsdijk, Scott, Kunst, Chua & 
Essen, 2020). Despite this, three striking issues have been raised. 
First, when attempting to unveil the impacts of institutional differ-
ences, international business (IB) researchers fall short on one particular 
count, that is, they often assume similar effects for all dimensions of 
institutional difference, especially economic and political differences, 
on MNE internationalization (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Meschi & Riccio, 2008; 
Pattnaik & Lee, 2014; Kang, Lee & Ghauri, 2017). However, Jackson & 
Deeg (2008) explain that due to the unique nature of each institution, 
institutional differences influence MNEs differently. Indeed, a few 
scholars report dissimilar effects of economic and political institutions 
(Tsang & Yip, 2007; Demirbag, Apaydin & Tatoglu, 2011; Rittippant & 
Rashee, 2015; Song & Lee, 2017). 
Second, institutional theorists tend to overestimate the negative 
outcome of “being foreign” on MNE internationalization (Stahl, Tung, 
Kostova & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2016; Lorenz, Clampit & Ramsey, 2018). 
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Institutional differences, while making it hard for MNEs to compromise 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008), could deliver several 
advantages that encourage MNEs to “stay abroad”, including unique 
resources, arbitrage opportunities, and innovation capacity (Gaur & Lu, 
2007; Edman, 2016). Hence, an inbuilt assumption that differences are 
detrimental can lead to erroneous conclusions (Clampit, Kedia, Fabian & 
Gaffney, 2015). Accordingly, it is important to broaden our mindset and 
provide a balanced treatment of the effect of differences (Stahl et al., 
2016). The Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS) perspective re-
flects this idea in the IB literature, emphasizing the advantages of dif-
ferences. However, this lens has received scant attention in the extant 
literature (Edman, 2016; Stahl et al., 2016). 
Third, the prior research tends to focus only on national differences, 
excluding firms’ specific interaction with the different context. This 
leads to oversimplification of the fact that the embeddedness of MNEs in 
national differences is not the same for all firms (Witt & Lewin, 2007; 
Graafland & Noorderhaven, 2020). For instance, it is likely that a 
Finnish MNE investing in China for the first time will be influenced 
differently by economic and political differences than a Finnish peer that 
already has ten subsidiaries in China. In this case, national differences 
refer to the differences between China and Finland, i.e., economic and 
political systems, while firms’ interactions refer to specific situations 
where Finnish firms interact with these different contexts. Accordingly, 
although the national economic and political differences between China 
and Finland are similar in both firms, the levels of firm interaction in the 
first case are likely different from those in the second, due to different 
levels of involvement, that is, first-time entry vs. several previous en-
tries, and sole subsidiary vs. ten subsidiaries. In other words, when a 
Finnish MNE has more interaction with China, it will be more deeply 
influenced by the host country environment than its home-country peers 
that have less interaction in the host country. 
By the same logic, scholars argue that depending on the levels of 
equity ownership, that is, international joint ventures (IJVs) and wholly 
owned subsidiaries (WOSs), foreign firms may be involved and influ-
enced dissimilarly by the different national context (Gaur & Lu, 2007; 
Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009; Pattnaik & Lee, 2014). Nevertheless, Meyer, 
Li & Schotter (2020) recently reported scant interest in IB research 
exploring multi-level interaction to external influences; for instance, in 
home-host conditions, and inter-firm reaction, where parent firms and 
subsidiary units work together to respond to changes in their external 
environment. This has motivated our research interest to delve into the 
influences of firm-level interaction. 
Motivated by these ideas, we examine the influences of economic 
and political differences on foreign divestments, and augment the extant 
literature in three ways. First, we apply the POS perspective, and reveal 
the multifaceted effects of economic and political differences, in order to 
understand whether or not differences could be benefits rather than 
always being disadvantageous (Clampit et al., 2015; Edman, 2016; Stahl 
et al., 2016). Accordingly, we eschew the conventional assumption 
regarding the negative influence of differences. Our tenet is that, at low 
levels of economic difference, foreign subsidiaries may enjoy several 
local resources and take advantage of economic arbitrage (Gaur & Lu, 
2007; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017). However, 
these benefits are not always available, while adaptation costs associ-
ated with searching for the advantages increase significantly when 
economic differences are higher (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Shirodkar & Konara, 
2017). Consequently, we propose that economic differences have both 
positive and negative effects that might emerge from cross-economic 
interactions. Thus, the effect on divestment probability is curvilinear. 
In contrast, political differences are less likely to provide such arbi-
trage opportunities, including favorable political changes and unique 
support from local governments, due to the dominant powers of local 
political agencies, higher adaptation costs, and potential criticisms from 
external stakeholders (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009; Giambona et al., 
2017; Lorenz et al., 2018; Cannizzaro, 2019; Cordero & Miller, 2019). 
Hence, we propose that political differences produce constraints and 
increase divestment propensity. 
Second, we switch to an advanced approach, friction, proposed by 
Shenkar (2001, 2012), instead of the common measure, “distance”, to 
assess the differences. While previous studies theoretically proposed 
that friction may be a more useful lens than distance (Clampit et al., 
2015; Lorenz et al., 2018), we are not merely invoking a friction lens 
when testing these differences, but actually measuring friction. Essen-
tially, friction refers to the extent to which different entities resist or rub 
up against each other in interactions in multilevel analysis (Shenkar, 
2001, 2012; Koch, Koch & Shenkar, 2016; Singh, Pattnaik, Lee & Gaur, 
2019). In other words, friction reflects the combined differences 
perceived at different levels, that is, national and firm levels. We argue 
that, depending on how firms encounter the different contexts, levels of 
friction defined in different situations are different. In addition, while 
Shenkar and his colleagues (Shenkar, 2001; Luo & Shenkar, 2011; Li, Liu 
& Qian, 2019; Singh et al., 2019) focus solely on cultural friction, we 
focus on economic and political frictions. We further compare findings 
on the effect of differences measured by distance and by friction, in 
order to assess the advancement and validity of the friction metric. 
Third, we contribute to the extant literature by uncovering the 
moderating effect of subsidiary ownership levels (WOSs vs. IJVs) on the 
economic and political friction - FD relationship. Past research reports 
that depending on different ownership levels, foreign subsidiaries will 
encounter different levels of interaction, leading to different propensity 
of divestments (Hennart, Kim & Zeng, 1998; Delios & Ensign, 2009). Luo 
& Shenkar (2011) echo this idea by theoretically proposing that foreign 
subsidiaries with different ownership levels encounter different levels of 
friction. Therefore, it is promising to empirically examine this proposal. 
2. Theory and hypotheses development 
Institutional theory discusses the influence of institutional differ-
ences on organizational survival and success (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008). Since MNEs always experi-
ence institutional differences when operating abroad, institutional the-
ory has become ubiquitous in the IB literature (Kostova et al., 2020). In 
Table 1, we review 16 novel studies on the effects of economic and 
political differences on FD, of which nine studies also include ownership 
levels in testing models. The table shows that while economic and po-
litical differences are measured using various indicators, the applied 
distance approach is similar in those studies. As noted above, IB re-
searchers tend to assume economic and political differences have a 
positive effect on divestment (Pattnaik & Lee, 2014; Kang et al., 2017). 
However, these effects are also found to be negative (Tsang & Yip, 2007; 
Xia, 2011) or non-significant (Meschi & Riccio, 2008; Meschi, Phan & 
Wassmer, 2016). Notably, focusing on arbitrage opportunities and costs, 
Gaur & Lu (2007) reported a curvilinear effect of regulative differences. 
The equivocal findings have led to an inevitable debate: What is the 
influence of economic and political differences on foreign divestments? 
2.1. POS perspective in IB studies 
Cameron (2017) explains that because individuals often remember 
the consequences of negative events rather than those of positive events, 
negative bias exists, especially among studies on organizational out-
comes and survival. Furthermore, researchers focus mainly on the 
strongest factors explaining the greatest variance, leading to unfair 
treatment of the positive effects (Cameron, 2017). Aiming to resolve the 
unbalanced treatment in the extant literature, we apply the POS 
perspective to highlight the multifaceted effects of economic and po-
litical differences on foreign divestment. POS is not a single theory per se, 
but represents a different view that focuses on both the positive and 
negative outcomes of a given phenomenon, and discusses the mecha-
nisms of the outcomes (Cameron & Caza, 2004; Stahl & Tung, 2015; 
Edman, 2016; Stahl et al., 2016). 
One primary objective of POS is to challenge the traditional bias 
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Table 1 
Previous studies on the relationship between economic & political differences and foreign divestment (or subsidiary survival) *  









Gaur & Lu 
(2007) 
20,177 Japanese foreign subsidiaries 
from 1986 to 2001 in 52 countries 








Tsang & Yip 
(2007) 
1,373 Singapore FDIs in 42 countries 
from 1980 to 2000 
Economic distance Main 
independent 
FDI survival The difference, in U.S. dollars, in the real 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
between Singapore and a host country in 
the first year of an FDI. 
Negative 
Meschi & Riccio 
(2008) 
234 IJVs that were formed in Brazil 
between 1973 and 2004 
Economic risk Main 
independent 
IJV survival A weighted average of government 
default on payments, the level of debt, 
inflation and the GNP figures per capita. 
Non- 
significant 
Political risk A weighted average of government and 
institutional stability, the socio- 
economic situation, the level of 
corruption and the government’s 




Annual variations in economic risk 
Variation in 
political risk 




12,000 + Japanese MNEs from 1986 
to 1997 in 25 countries 




Multiple interview responses reported in 
the World Competitiveness Survey from 






Industry entry and exit rates for eight 
European countries – Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 







Total factor productivity Positive 
Capital/labor 
intensity 
The (%) growth in the physical capital 
services per hour worked (K/L Growth) 
Negative 
Xia (2011) 587 alliances were formed in 49 host 
countries by 525 multi- national 
corporations based in 41 home 
countries from 1990 to 2007 
Institutional 






Factor analysis for the absolute value of 




(Tsang & Yip, 
2007) 
Absolute logarithmic difference in the 
GDP per capita 
Demirbag et al. 
(2011) 
265 Japanese subsidiaries in MENA 
countries from 1956 to 2003 




Absolute logarithmic difference in the 




Difference between economic freedom 
indices of two countries 
Positive 
(Bai, Jin, & Qi, 
2013) 
489 Chinese FDIs in 39 countries and 







MOFTEC score Negative 
Pattnaik & Lee 
(2014) 
2435 foreign affiliates of 1697 Korean 
manufacturing MNCs in 67 different 














announcements (mostly within Asia) 
of 46 Thai MNEs from 1995 to 2005 









Economic freedom Positive 
Meschi et al. 
(2016) 
3835 foreign entries into Vietnam 
from 1987 to 2008 




Host country’s GDP growth Non- 
significant 
Song & Lee 
(2017) 
5306 observations of foreign 
production subsidiaries of 439 Korean 







The negative value of the annual 
percentage change in consumer 
spending multiply number of years 
Positive 
Political openness Control 
variable 
Multiple interview responses reported in 
the World Competitiveness Survey from 
1989 to 1998 
Non- 
significant 
Kang et al. 
(2017) 
3574 foreign manufacturing 
subsidiary observations of 2439 
Korean manufacturing MNCs located 







Berry et al. (2010) concept - 
Mahalanobis distance 
Positive 
(Liu & Li, 2020) 8698 foreign subsidiaries of 93 








Total fatalities caused by business- 
related terrorist attacks in a host country 
where a given MNE’s subsidiaries are 






29,014 observations pertaining to 
5093 foreign subsidiary investments 
established in 18 emerging markets by 








Transparency International’s Corruption 




Policy stability Control 
variable 
Henisz’s (2002) political constraints 




The average of the Heritage 
Foundation’s business and monetary 
freedom indexes in home country 
Dummy variable (OECD vs. non.OECD) 
(continued on next page) 
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regarding the negative impact of differences, and emphasize the need to 
pay fair attention to positive influences (Cameron & Caza, 2004; 
Cameron, 2017). The POS perspective encourages researchers not to 
consider institutional differences not only as challenges, but also op-
portunities for arbitrage, complementarity, or creative diversity (Stahl & 
Tung, 2015; Zaheer, Schomaker & Nachum, 2012). For instance, elab-
orating on the POS lens, Edman (2016) admitted that while the liability 
of foreignness still mattered, being different could improve firm inno-
vation, provide unique human capital, develop new market segments, 
and consumer preference. Accordingly, Stahl at el. (2016) encouraged 
researchers to allow for the multifaceted effects of institutional differ-
ences, rather than adhere to a monotonous hypothesis, when theorizing 
their proposal. On other words, researchers should study the mecha-
nisms generating benefits or challenges stemming from the differences 
in specific situations. 
Applying the POS lens, we investigate the specific nature of each 
institutional environment, that is, economic and political institutions, 
and its influences on the chances of subsidiary survival. In so doing, we 
emphasize the benefits and disadvantages of the differences, and theo-
rize that “being different” is not always disadvantageous. Instead, 
depending on the institution and situation, differences may create ad-
vantages and benefits that increase the probability of survival, or 
accelerate difficulties and increase hazards among foreign subsidiaries. 
2.2. Measuring the differences: from distance to friction 
Institutional theorists have coined the term institutional distance to 
measure institutional differences quantitatively, which is a convenient 
method to apply (Konara & Mohr, 2019). Distance is also applied to 
measure the differences pertaining to each dimensional institution, that 
is, economic and political institutions (Berry et al., 2010; Pattnaik & Lee, 
2014; Kang et al., 2017). Nevertheless, given that previous findings on 
the influence of institutional distance are contradictory, researchers 
have questioned the reliability and validity of the distant concept 
(Shenkar, 2001; 2012; Luo & Shenkar, 2011; Konara & Mohr, 2019). 
One of the main criticisms of the distance concept is that distance 
reflects only national differences, even though firms may interact with 
the different context at different levels (see Shenkar, 2001, 2012; Popli, 
Akbar, Kumar & Gaur, 2016; Konara & Mohr, 2019, for more details). 
Simply put, the distance concept assumes that all firms within the same 
pair of home-host countries are influenced equally by institutional dif-
ferences, regardless of the different levels of the firms’ interaction with 
the differences. However, IB scholars have emphasized the importance 
of considering contextual variations in examining the influence of 
institutional differences (Orr & Scott, 2008; Slangen & Hennart, 2008b; 
Singh et al., 2019). For instance, Orr & Scott (2008) highlighted that 
impacts of institutional differences vary in different situations firms 
encounter. Similarly, Singh et al. (2019) stated that in specific circum-
stances, foreign subsidiaries are influenced diversely by institutional 
differences, while Lorenz et al. (2018) found that institutional differ-
ences bring positive outcomes to innovation, due to the diversity. 
Moreover, Mondejar & Zhao (2013) encouraged researchers to deter-
mine levels of institutional differences based on the perceived entities, 
because the linkage between firms and the specific institutional envi-
ronment remains underexplored. Schmid & Morschett (2020) added that 
a macro measure of institutional risk cannot assess the levels of risk that 
influence foreign divestments. 
In addition, distance assumes a linear effect of institutional differ-
ences, since the concept does not consider the reverse impact, although 
foreign subsidiaries may gain experience over time or through changes 
during their operations (Luo & Shenkar, 2011; Zeng et al., 2013; Popli 
et al., 2016). Accordingly, distance could not reflect potentially 
changeable mechanisms that generate the influences of institutional 
differences. Overall, we conclude that distance may not be an appro-
priate measure by which to examine the influence of institutional dif-
ferences, since the concept fails to reflect the multifaceted, multilevel, 
and contextual variation of institutional differences, resulting from the 
diverse industries from which the studies are often drawn. Therefore, in 
line with the POS lens that emphasizes the multifaceted effect of insti-
tutional differences, we employ friction, a metric proposed by Shenkar 
and his colleagues (Shenkar, 2001; 2012; Luo & Shenkar, 2011), to 
evaluate the influences of economic and political differences. 
Friction has garnered considerable attention as it considers not only 
the differences at the national level, but also the variation in organiza-
tional contexts when defining the differences (Koch et al., 2016; Li et al., 
2019; Singh et al., 2019). In other words, levels of friction that foreign 
subsidiaries encounter will be specified depending on the national dif-
ferences, and on the weighted domains of interaction points (Shenkar, 
2011; 2012; Luo & Shenkar, 2011). 
IB scholars have employed friction through the cognitive-cultural 
aspect or language dimension (Orr & Scott, 2008; Luo & Shenkar, 
2011; Joshi & Lahiri, 2015; Li et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2019). Yet, 
Zaheer et al. (2012) proposed that Shenkar’s criticisms are applicable to 
other dimensions of institutional differences. In a similar vein, scholars 
have argued that the process of interaction and resistance leading to 
friction is equally validated in the context of other institutional di-
mensions (Orr & Scott, 2008; Popli et al., 2016). Hence, we expect 
friction may be more appropriate than distance to assess the differences 
in economic and political differences. 
Luo & Shenkar (2011) proposed several factors, that is, speed (V), 
sequence (G) of foreign expansion, and number of contact points or 
contact surfaces (N) to define levels of firm interaction. They argued that 
those factors reflect how foreign firms develop their operations in host 
countries, considering accumulated experiences and changes in expan-
sion space, sequence or number of interaction points (Luo & Shenkar, 
2011; Li et al., 2019). More precisely, N represents the degree of inter-
action that firms have in foreign countries. When N is higher, firm 
dependence on local resources is higher. Similarly, the level of friction is 
Table 1 (continued ) 









Wang & Larimo 
(2020) 
1345 acquisitions made by 174 
Finnish firms in 59 countries from 










Host country risk Differences in ECR country scores 
between the year of divestments and 
investment 
Negative 
*Criteria of choosing previous studies for this table based on: (1) foreign divestment studies related to institutional differences, focusing more on economic and political 
differences or relevant indicators; (2) key studies by leading scholars in the field; (3) studies that show continuous research stream of foreign divestment, more up-to- 
date papers. 
**For clarity, the conclusions presented in the ‘Findings (adjusted)’ column represent the effect of economic and political distance on foreign subsidiary divestment. 
For papers where the dependent variable was subsidiary survival, the original results have been adjusted accordingly. For example, if the relationship between 
economic distance and subsidiary survival in an article is reported as negative and significant, we report the relationship in this table as positive and significant. 
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also higher as a result of heterogeneous institutional requirements 
across locations. In addition, when MNEs adopt a lower speed of foreign 
expansion (V), they will better align their experiential knowledge with 
host-country risks and uncertainty. Consequently, the MNEs encounter 
lower levels of friction. Luo & Shenkar (2011) further argued that 
foreign subsidiaries face greater liabilities of foreignness at the initial 
stage of foreign expansion (G), and, thus, escalating levels of friction. 
Moreover, at this initial stage, it is difficult and costly for foreign sub-
sidiaries to collect, analyze and interpret relevant information pertain-
ing to host markets, given their lack of local experience. Collectively, the 
three factors reflect levels of firms’ interaction with different contexts, 
playing a crucial role in defining levels of friction. It is also worth noting 
that economic and political friction values, as combinations of distance 
and firm interaction, are changeable, because levels of firm interaction 
(i.e., N, V, G) are changeable. 
Elaborating further on the concept, we explain that a simple com-
bination of low levels of economic or political distance with low levels of 
firm interaction will generate low levels of economic and political fric-
tion, respectively. By contrast, high levels of economic and political 
distance combined with high levels of firm’s interaction will generate 
high levels of economic and political friction. We further propose that 
while previous findings on effects of economic and political differences 
are essentially based on the distance metric, as opposed to the friction 
metric, mechanisms leading to economic or political distance’ effects 
should broadly apply to friction. In arguing that the friction approach is 
superior to the distance approach, the former explicitly builds upon the 
latter. As elaborated above, the key distinctions between distance and 
friction are three firm-level factors: the speed, sequence and overall 
amount of international expansion. 
2.3. Economic friction and foreign divestment decisions 
Prior studies have confirmed the significant influence of economic 
differences on foreign divestments (Tsang & Yip, 2007; Pattnaik & Lee, 
2014; Kang et al., 2017). Considering both the benefits and disadvan-
tages of economic difference (i.e., Gaur & Lu, 2007; Malhotra et al., 
2011; Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017), we propose that economic friction is 
not always disruptive, and that friction may offer several benefits. Pre-
cisely, we theorize that economic friction influences FD probability as a 
U-shape for two critical reasons. 
First, integrating insights from the institution-based view, resource- 
based theory, and transaction cost economics, previous studies show 
that when operating in economically different countries, foreign sub-
sidiaries gain various advantages, namely economic arbitrage (Gaur & 
Lu, 2007), and get access to new and more similar markets (Evans & 
Mavondo, 2002; Demirbag et al., 2011; Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst & 
Lange, 2014; Liou & Rao-Nicholson, 2019). Further benefits may arise 
from ownership advantages (Dunning, 1988), and assets of foreignness, 
that is, unique resources, capabilities or opportunities only available to 
foreign firms (Edman, 2016; Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017). We argue 
that, importantly, these advantages strengthen as level of economic 
friction increases. The advantages increase the benefits that foreign 
subsidiaries receive, and supply a motive for staying longer in distant 
countries. Those benefits accruing to MNEs for pursuing international-
ization strategies or exploiting local resources would otherwise be lost 
(Song & Lee, 2017). It is worth noting that foreign subsidiaries always 
incur extra costs and take more risks to explore and exploit added 
benefits, while the advantages are not always available (Gaur & Lu, 
2007; Popli et al., 2016). Accordingly, there would be a point at which 
increased costs were higher than achieved benefits, leading to a reverse 
net impact of economic differences (Gaur & Lu, 2007). 
Second, as noted above, foreign subsidiaries may not gain benefits 
without committing to initial costs. Past research has highlighted that 
foreign subsidiaries incur organizational and transaction costs to set up 
business in a foreign country, and start exploiting or exploring local 
resources (Meschi et al., 2016; Song & Lee, 2017; Wang & Larimo, 
2020). Similarly, Kang et al. (2017) argued that since MNEs have less 
information about host markets, there will be start-up costs to acquire 
such information. Furthermore, when foreign subsidiaries want to 
exploit more resources, they are likely to have more interaction with the 
local context. Hence, they would incur higher ex-ante and ex-post costs 
and risks that create more difficulties (Malhotra et al., 2011; Popli et al., 
2016). In sum, we propose a curvilinear relationship between economic 
friction and FD. 
Precisely, at low levels of economic friction, foreign subsidiaries 
have to make an initial financial investment to set up their operation, as 
they encounter degrees of uncertainty in the host institutional envi-
ronment. However, there will be several benefits to offset these costs and 
risks, and well-prepared strategic plans will further ameliorate the sit-
uation (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017). But this rela-
tionship is not stable, and once level of economic friction rises above a 
certain threshold, which the achieved benefits do not offset the 
increased costs, the cost-benefit relationship is reversed. 
Hence, once above that threshold, higher levels of economic friction 
create more difficulties for foreign subsidiaries to overcome, and they 
face more challenges to identify and satisfy customers’ needs and pref-
erence (Berry et al., 2010; Kang et al., 2017). On encountering high 
levels of economic friction, subsidiaries also find it harder to apply 
accumulated experience from previous investments, due to greater 
contextual variation among previous experiences (Zeng et al., 2013; 
Popli et al., 2016). Furthermore, subsidiaries have to incur extra costs to 
leverage local resources, although the resources are narrower and not 
always available (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Hence, higher levels of economic 
friction escalate FD probability. 
We integrate the aforementioned discussion in Fig. 1, following 
Haans, Pieters & He (2016), and contend that the combination of the 
benefits and costs that foreign subsidiaries are subject to in economically 
different countries will result in a U-shaped effect on foreign di-
vestments. Precisely, at lower levels of economic friction, the benefits of 
exploiting and exploring local opportunities will increase, albeit at a 
decreasing rate, leading to a negative effect on foreign divestment. 
However, when levels of friction increase beyond a certain threshold, 
the relevant costs for foreign subsidiaries to access and diffuse the 
benefits grow at an increasing rate, thus, yielding a positive effect on 
divestment. Taken together, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between economic friction 
and the likelihood of foreign divestment is a U-shape. 
2.4. Political friction and foreign divestment decisions 
Past research has highlighted the significant effect of political dif-
ferences, as the most impeding factor, on MNEs’ IB strategies, and 
particularly on foreign divestments (Kang et al., 2017; Sartor & 
Beamish, 2020). We apply political friction as a combined measure of 
political distance and firm interaction with national political differ-
ences, in order to examine influence of political differences on foreign 
divestment. 
Elaborating on the nature of political differences, we argue that 
political friction increases the likelihood of foreign divestments. Gaur & 
Lu (2007) stated that foreign subsidiaries threaten their own existence, 
due to the risks of governmental appropriation and local hostile pressure 
in host countries. Dhanaraj & Beamish (2009) also argued that political 
differences place foreign subsidiaries in a disadvantageous position, due 
to the complexity and lack of transparency of business regulations, or 
constraints relating to repatriating profits, obtaining local financing, and 
transfer pricing. Similarly, Pattnaik & Lee (2014) found that differences 
in political regimes and uncertainty in regulation adversely hampered 
the efficiency of MNEs’ operations. The differences magnify agency costs 
exponentially, due to the opportunistic behavior of managers and other 
local collaborators, and outweigh the benefits that MNEs derive from 
internationalization (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Kang et al., 2017). Meschi & 
Riccio (2008) further showed that when political uncertainty increases, 
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foreign subsidiaries are less likely to access local benefits to achieve 
initial entry objectives, since they have lower bargaining power. 
Elaborating on the friction concept, we argue that if foreign sub-
sidiaries have more political interaction with the host country, they are 
influenced more strongly as they need to comply with more political 
requirements for their operations, leading them to be more prone to 
divestment (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Similarly, if subsidiaries are first en-
trants, they need to deal with higher degrees of liabilities of foreignness 
and face greater pressure from local groups, yielding higher levels of 
political friction (Slangen & Hennart, 2008a). By contrast, subsidiaries 
receiving support from sister companies already present in the host 
country, may not be subject to high levels of friction (Kim, Lu & Rhee, 
2012). 
We further emphasize that, the effect of political friction on divest-
ment is linear rather than curved, for three critical reasons. First, po-
litical differences constitute the greatest challenges for MNEs, while 
political advantages may be not available to foreign entrants (Chao & 
Kumar, 2010; Giambona, Graham & Harvey, 2017; Lorenz et al., 2018; 
Graafland & Noorderhaven, 2020). For instance, prior studies show that 
political differences may not produce arbitrage opportunities, due to the 
dominant powers of host political agents, and higher adaptation costs 
(Cannizzaro, 2019; Sartor & Beamish, 2020; Witte, Burger & Pennings, 
2020). Similarly, Giambona et al. (2017) proposed that MNE managers 
tend to avoid, not simply reduce investments, and exit host countries 
with high political risks, since political risk is more severe than other 
forms of risk. Second, Dhanaraj & Beamish (2009) proposed that among 
the FD studies there is an implied assumption that when subsidiaries 
exist in foreign countries, they have already incurred start-up costs to 
overcome political hurdles, and any favorable change in those hurdles is 
unlikely to create new opportunities that will facilitate their survival. 
Third, we propose that external stakeholders, i.e., customers, local 
interest groups and rivals, would criticize the MNEs and local govern-
ment, were there to be negotiations between them relating to unique 
support or political changes available only to foreign firms, that is, lower 
local taxes, favored support for transfer pricing, and other favors. Hence, 
MNEs will be less likely to allow their foreign units to involve themselves 
in such negotiations. For instance, Sartor & Beamish (2020) showed that 
if MNEs have to deal with higher levels of political corruption, they will 
find it harder to manage and regulate subsidiaries’ behaviors, leading to 
a higher probability of divestment. In sum, we argue that political 
friction creates difficulties and constraints for firms, leading to a higher 
propensity for divestment. Accordingly, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between political friction 
and foreign divestment is positive. 
2.5. Moderating effect of subsidiary ownership levels 
The FD literature proposes that depending on different ownership 
levels, that is, IJVs or WOSs, foreign subsidiaries may encounter 
different levels of institutional differences, which may in turn bring 
additional uncertainty and complexity, leading to different propensities 
for foreign divestment (Makino & Beamish, 1998; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 
2004; Lu & Hébert, 2005; Gaur & Lu, 2007; Meschi et al., 2016; Kim & 
Kim, 2018). Proposing the friction concept, Luo & Shenkar (2011) 
echoed the call to pay attention to the moderating effect of several 
factors that modify levels of friction. Ownership is one such moderator. 
However, this proposal lacks empirical evidence. In this respect, our 
study provides an ideal research setting to investigate the moderating 
effect of ownership levels on the economic and political friction – 
foreign divestment relationship. 
The extant literature has examined the direct impact of ownership 
levels on divestment, yet the findings are equivocal. For instance, Lu & 
Hébert (2005) proposed that IJVs could take advantage of local partners, 
to alleviate differences in host countries, gain a better understanding of 
the external environment, and make better strategic decisions, leading 
to lower rates of divestment. Similarly, researchers argue that IJVs have 
higher chances of survival than WOSs, because IJVs can combine the 
strength of each partner, broaden product diversification, achieve 
economies of scale, enhance capacity to adapt to external uncertainty, 
and, reduce legitimacy asymmetry (Lu & Hébert, 2005; Meschi et al., 
2016; Kim & Kim, 2018). 
Contrariwise, Schmid & Morschett (2020) argued that with higher 
levels of ownership (i.e., WOSs), MNEs could promote their own exec-
utives to key positions in foreign subsidiaries to support the decision- 
making process. In the same fashion, WOSs have been confirmed to 
have lower rates of divestment, due to the avoidance of complications in 
the decision-making process, of declining efficiency, or of technological 
knowledge leaking to other firms (Leung, 1997; Hennart et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, because of higher equity ownership levels in WOSs, MNEs 
may input more attention and resources, thus decreasing the propensity 
Fig. 1. Costs, benefits and foreign divestment probability at different levels of economic differences.  
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of divestment (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Notably, a few researchers have 
highlighted that the fate of divestment is not likely related to ownership 
levels per se, but relate to entry motivations (Makino & Beamish, 1998; 
Lu & Hébert, 2005; Makino, Chan, Isobe & Beamish, 2007; Papyrina, 
2007; Meschi et al., 2016). As noted, these previous findings pertain to a 
direct impact, rather than emphasizing the moderating impact of 
ownership levels on economic and political differences. 
In their discourse on friction, Luo & Shenkar (2011) argued that IJVs 
involve higher levels of friction due to the greater scope for operational 
and managerial blending. When the relationship between IJVs’ partners 
is complex, the interactions between entities become more frequent, 
multifaceted, and complicated. In line with this, we theorize that IJVs 
encounter higher levels of interaction with different contexts as there 
are two layers of interaction involved, that is, national and firm levels, 
while WOSs interact at only the national level. In other words, while 
IJVs need to handle home-host differences as a business system and with 
differences between partners, WOSs have to address only the differences 
between countries (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Makino 
& Neupert, 2000). 
We acknowledge that with support from local partners, IJVs may 
involve lower levels of external interaction, while WOSs may incur 
initial costs in order to compromise on economic and political re-
quirements in host countries. However, elaborating on the friction 
perspective, we argue that WOSs may manage their levels of friction at 
an acceptable rate, by gradually increasing levels of interaction with the 
external environment and accumulated experience (Zeng et al., 2013). 
In addition, they could maintain sustainable growth based on their own 
accumulated experience, and developed local networks with an external 
environment (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Further, in IJVs this interaction would 
likely increase when foreign entrants want more local business trans-
actions, or at later stages of their development (Makino & Neupert, 
2000; Gaur & Lu, 2007). In addition, WOSs may avoid social conflicts 
between partners due to their sole ownership structure or dominant 
powers over local partners (if any) (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Gaur & 
Lu, 2007; Schmid & Morschett, 2020). In contrast, IJVs may accelerate 
the negative outcome of “being different” due to higher levels of conflict 
in management teams, and complicated decision-making processes (Li, 
1995; Hennart et al., 1998; Luo & Shenkar, 2011). We summarize the 
key differences in interaction levels of IJVs and WOSs in Table 2. In sum, 
we argue that the curved effect of economic friction on divestment will 
be flatter, and the positive effect of political friction on divestment will 
be weaker among WOSs than among IJVs. Accordingly, we propose the 
following: 
Hypothesis 3: The U-shape relationship between economic friction and 
foreign divestment probability will become flatter in the case of WOSs 
compared to IJVs. 
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between political friction and 
foreign divestment probability will be weaker in the case of WOSs compared 
to IJVs. 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Sample 
The empirical data for the study are based on Finnish MNEs’ foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) in the manufacturing sector from 1970 to 
2010, the status of which were checked at the end of 2016, itself used as 
the cut-off year to avoid the two-year honeymoon bias effects (Gaur & 
Lu, 2007; Wang & Larimo, 2020). We collected the Finnish MNEs’ in-
formation from the Thompson and ORBIS databases, and performed a 
systematic analysis of the investing firms’ annual reports, press releases, 
data gathered in FDI surveys, and direct contact, to identify divestment 
of foreign units. 
Finnish MNEs constituted a particularly good research context for 
three critical reasons. First, Finland is among the most competitive of 
140 ranked countries, despite its small size in the global arena (Global 
Table 2 




Definitions Major equity (i.e. more 
than 95%) of firms are 
belonging to a parent from 
a home country. 
A joint equity (<95%) 
shared between a foreign 
parent firm (or many) with a 
local parent firm (or many). 
Managing legitimacy Involving mainly external 
legitimacy because the 
WOS is invested by only a 
parent firm (do not 
involve internal 
legitimacy between 
partners) (Kim & Kim, 
2018). 
Involving in both external 
and internal legitimacy 
because the IJV needs to 
respond to external 
environment (at host 
country) and to local 
parents, as a part of the local 
institution (Hennart et al., 
1998; (Lu & Xu, 2006)). IJV 
needs to secure internal 
legitimacy by conforming to 
isomorphic pressures of 






WOS needs to deal with 
uncertainty in economic 
and political differences 
without support from 
local partners, whereas 
the amount of accessed 
resources at initial stage 
could be limited due to 
liability of foreignness. 
Consequently, WOS tends 
to involve higher levels of 
interaction with external 
environment, i.e. host 
political and economic 
institutions. 
However, WOS may 
manage their levels of 
friction at an acceptable 
rate by gradually 
increasing levels of 
interaction with the 
external environment and 
with accumulated 
experience (Zeng et al., 
2013). Hence, at later 
stage of operation, WOS 
could enjoy higher levels 
of benefits, while 
uncertainty of being 
foreign at initial stage 
could be offset by 
accumulated experiences. 
In addition, WOS could 
minimize transaction 
costs arising from 
coordination problems ( 
Gaur & Lu, 2007). 
IJV may reduce levels of 
foreignness, increase levels 
of local legitimacy, enjoy 
structural legitimacy and 
enhance the external 
legitimacy because of its 
status as partly a child 
organization of a local firm 
and of a legitimacy process 
((Li, 1995); (Lu and Hébert, 
2005)). 
IJV also shortens the time 
and decreases costs needed 
to establish legitimacy in 
the local environment, 
easily obtains financial and 
human resources in local 
markets, develops networks 
with local suppliers and 
buyers; and accesses local 
partners’ distinctive and 
network-based resources 
and capabilities (Lu & Xu, 
2006; Papyrina, 2007). 
However, IJV involves 
higher transaction costs to 
ensure that collaboration 
produces maximum 
synergies (Papyrina, 2007). 
Furthermore, local partners 
may not help much if IJV 
has higher levels of 
interaction with local 
environment, that is, 
exploring more local 
resources and dealing with 
local customers, suppliers, 
etc. Accordingly, IJV needs 
to depend more on local 
support, leading to lower 
levels of bargaining power 
in decision-making process ( 





WOS may have faster and 
more efficient decision 
making processess and 
less scope of conflict 
because higher levels of 
equity ownership provide 
a parent firm with a 
greater degree of control 
over the systems, methods 
and decisions of its 
subsidiary (Dhanaraj & 
Beamish, 2004; Gaur & 
There are more conflict in 
making organizational 
decisions as both foreign 
and local partners may fight 
for their preferences ( 
Hennart et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, managerial 
blending also leads to 
complicated decision- 
making processes (Gaur & 
Lu, 2007; Luo & Shenkar, 
2011). IJV may also be 
(continued on next page) 
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Competitiveness Report, 2018). Also, along with other Nordic countries, 
it accounts for a significant amount of outward FDI. Second, although 
our paper is not about culture, it is still important to consider cultural 
differences, as they reflect how people think, believe and behave, which 
later influences their strategic decisions (Hofstede, 1980; Koch et al., 
2016). As Finnish national culture, based on the Hofstede and GLOBE 
frameworks, differs from those of the United States, Japan, and other 
non-Nordic countries, it makes our sample an excellent venue for 
investigating the influences of institutional differences on FD decisions. 
Third, the extant studies on foreign divestment focus mainly on US, 
Japanese, Korean or Chinese MNEs, while Western firms have received 
scant attention (Koch et al., 2016). Hence, as a good representative of 
the Nordic region, Finland could help fill this gap, and provide good 
knowledge on how firms in the region develop IB strategies. 
In assessing the influences of economic and political friction, we 
attempt to compensate for the use of single-country data by including 
FDIs with diverse levels of firm interaction, that is, sequence and speed 
of internationalization, and number of subsidiaries. In addition, our data 
include subsidiaries with different ownership levels, in different in-
dustries, and with various years of international experiences. In sum, the 
diverse levels of interaction lead to different levels of friction, although 
Finland constitutes the only home country. 
In total, we identified 2548 investments, with 1190 cases divested 
during the period. However, 75 divested cases were excluded because 
they were the consequence of corporate divestment, referring to closure 
or sell-off of whole MNEs. We further excluded 73 cases due to missing 
information concerning parent firm size or divestment years. Thus, our 
final sample comprises 2400 investments made by 310 MNEs in 65 
different host countries, with 1042 cases divested during the period. 
3.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the probability of foreign 
divestment, and is operationalized as a binary variable, coded as 1 if the 
investment is divested, and 0 otherwise. In addition, a subsidiary sur-
viving at the end of the observation period would be treated as a right- 
censored case (Getachew & Beamish, 2017; Kang et al., 2017; Peng & 
Beamish, 2019; Tan & Sousa, 2019; Sartor & Beamish, 2020). 
3.3. Independent variables 
The key predictors in our study are economic and political friction. 
Following Luo & Shenkar (2011), we construct economic friction (EF) 
and political friction (PF) at national and firm levels. Accordingly, we 
first follow Berry et al. (2010) and apply Mahalanobis distance to 
compute economic distance (ED) and political distance (PD) between 
countries (national level). Berry et al.’s (2010) scale is applied in this 
study because it measures ED and PD as a set of multi-dimensional in-
dicators, which are confirmed to significantly influence MNE operations. 
Hence, the scale could reflect multifaceted aspects of different contexts. 
IB researchers have applied this scale in subsidiary divestment analysis 
and yielded significant findings (Kang et al., 2017; Pattnaik & Lee, 
2014). Essentially, Berry et al. (2010) construct ED to reflect the dif-
ferences in economic development and macroeconomic characteristics, 
including national income, inflation, export and import, while PD 
measures the differences in political stability, democracy, and trade bloc 
membership, measured by policy-making uncertainty, democratic 
character, size of the state, WTO membership, and regional trade 
agreements. 
Then, at firm level, we evaluate firms’ internationalization speed (V), 
sequence (G), and contact surface (N). Precisely, V is measured as the 
increase in the number of active foreign investments held by the parent 
firm in the corresponding year. G = [0;1] represents the sequence of 
internationalization of MNEs. G is computed such that the first invest-
ment a parent firm makes in a specific country is coded as 0. Subsequent 
investments in that country are coded as the ratio between the order of 
the investment and the maximum number of entries by any Finnish firm 
into that specific country, yielding a maximum value of 1. We also 
computed N as the sum of all the active foreign investments held by the 
parent firm in the corresponding year. Hence, friction is calculated as 
follows: 
EF = eV(1− G) ×
ED
10
× N;PF = eV(1− G) ×
PD
10
× N  
where, e is constant and equal to 2.7183. To test our Hypotheses 3 and 4, 
we coded the subsidiary ownership levels (WOS) as a dummy variable, 1 
for foreign subsidiaries with over 95 percent of equity, 0 otherwise 
(Hennart et al., 1998; Delios & Ensign, 2009). 
3.4. Control variables 
Our study controls for several variables pertaining to multilevel 
analysis, which have been confirmed in previous studies to significantly 
influence FD probability. More precisely, we control for several factors 
at host country levels, including: population, birth rate, literacy rate, 
corporate income tax rate, EU membership, and cultural friction. Those 
variables are popularly controlled in the previous IB studies to reflect 
MNEs’ entry and exit decisions. At the parent level, we control for size, 
product diversification, research and development (R&D) intensity, 
number of foreign countries, and years of international experiences. At 
the subsidiary level, we control for the age and relatedness of the unit. 
Table 3 describes the definitions, measurements, and references of all 
the variables included in our models. 
3.5. Analytical strategies 
The Cox proportional hazards model (Cox & Oakes, 1984) is ubiq-
uitous in the FD literature, as the model offers several advantages for 
analyzing hazard rate (Pattnaik & Lee, 2014; Kang et al., 2017; Song & 
Lee, 2017). One of the advantages is suitability for modeling different 
forms of event history data, since the model does not need an assump-
tion of any functional form for the underlying hazard function, relative 
to parametric models (Song, 2014). As such, the hazard rate can be 
presented as log-linear functions of the various firm- and subsidiary- 
level covariates (Kang et al., 2017). However, instead of using the 
basic Cox model, which assumes no unobserved heterogeneity or event 
dependence, we apply a frailty Cox proportional hazard model to test the 
likelihood of foreign divestment (Berry, 2013; Lee, Chung & Beamish, 
2019). This frailty model accounts for cluster-specific homogeneities, 
the inherent nature that the subsidiary is nested in its parent companies 
(Austin, 2017; Lee et al., 2019). The frailty models also consider whether 
the same firm may suffer the hazard more than once as a result of un-
measured causes (Berry, 2013). 
4. Results 
The descriptive Pearson correlation in Table 4 displays a few high 
correlations among the variables, so the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
test was conducted to diagnose multicollinearity among the variables. 
The result shows that multicollinearity is not a problem among our 
variables (because the highest was 1.63 for MNEs’ size). 




Lu, 2007; Schmid & 
Morschett, 2020). 
troubled not only by 
cultural differences between 
partners, but also by 
difficulties in sharing 
proprietary assets (Li, 
1995).  
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We report the survival analysis results for the hypotheses testing in 
Table 5, including 12 models. Model 1 includes only control variables, 
Models 2–5 test the linear and non-linear effects of EF and PF on FD 
probability. Models 6–12 test the moderating effects of subsidiary 
ownership levels on the friction–divestment probability relationship. In 
general, our models are significant at high levels, and adding the 
moderating variables increases the significant value (p-value < 0.001). 
Among the control variables, our results show that parent and sub-
sidiary levels – factors are significantly associated with foreign divest-
ment rate, except for R&D intensity and number of foreign countries in 
which MNEs are operating. We also found that cultural friction, birth 
rate, literacy rate, and corporate income tax rate significantly influence 
FD probability, while population and EU membership are not relevant to 
divestment decisions. 
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that EF influences FD probability 
following a U-shape, such that low levels of friction decrease FD prob-
ability until a turning point, after which, adding friction increases the 
probability. As noted above, we follow Haans et al.’s (2016) proposal to 
examine the U-shaped relationship. Accordingly, we first checked the 
direction of linear and square-coefficients. Second, we examined 
whether the slopes on both sides are significant, and, third, we examined 
whether the turning point is within the data range. Our analysis in 
Model 3 shows that the EF coefficient is negative (β = − 2.097, p-value <
0.001), while the squared term is positive (β = 1.334, p-value < 0.01). 
Next, we checked the significance of the negative and positive slopes of 
the U shape, using the following formula:  
β1 + 2*β2*XL and β1 + 2*β2*XH                                                             
where β1 and β2 are the estimated coefficients of EF and its squared term, 
respectively, while XL and XH represent the lowest and highest EF values 
in the data range, respectively. In the current data, the minimum value 
of EF is 0, while the maximum value is 1.49. We found that at the low 
end, the slope is negative and significant (− 2.097, p-value < 0.05), and 
at the high end, the slope is positive and significant (1.878, p-value <
0.05). We then estimated the turning point of the EF impact (as - β1/2* 
β2), and confirmed that the turning point (0.786) is well within the data 
range. Hence, we can reasonably confirm the existence of the U-shaped 
relationship between EF and foreign divestment probability, supporting 
Hypothesis 1. 
To test the relationship between PF and FD probability (Hypothesis 
2), we included PF in Model 4. Our result shows that the PF coefficient is 
significantly positive (β = 1.043, p-value < 0.001). We further added the 
PF squared term in Model 5 to test a potential U-shaped relationship 
between PF and FD probability. The empirical results do not support the 
curved shape. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is supported, meaning that PF is 
positively associated with FD probability. We further plotted the re-
lationships of EF and PF on foreign divestment probability in Figs. 2 and 
3. In Fig. 2, we show that EF influences the divestment probability, 
following the U-shaped form, while Fig. 3 indicates that PF increases FD 
probability. 
We proposed in Hypothesis 3 that WOSs flatten the U-shaped rela-
tionship between EF and divestment probability. Therefore, we 
continued incrementally adding variables (WOS and the interacting 
measure of WOS with EF, linear and squared values) in Models 6–8. The 
likelihood value was significant at p < 0.001, showing that the model 
was a good fit. Precisely, our results show that WOS is negative and 
significant. Hence, we confirmed that WOSs are less likely to be divested 
Table 3 
Definitions and measurements of variables used in the study.  
Variables Definitions and measures References 
1. Subsidiary 
divestment 
Instant hazard ratio based on 
event dummy (1: divested, 0: 
not divested) 
Pattnaik & Lee (2014); 
Kang et al. (2017); Wang 
& Larimo (2020) 
2. Subsidiaries’ age The years the foreign affiliate is 
present in the foreign market 
Kang et al. (2017); Tan & 
Sousa (2019) 
3. Firm size Natural logarithm of 
worldwide annual sales of the 
parent company (in mil euros) 
in the year preceding the 
investment 
Kang et al. (2017); Wang 
& Larimo (2020); (Liu & 
Li, 2020) 
4. Unrelatedness A dummy variable which has a 
value of 1 (0 otherwise) when 
the investment is not in the 
same industry as one of the 
parent firm’s existing 
businesses. This is based on the 
4-digit SIC codes 
Tsang & Yip (2007); 
Berry (2013); Song 
(2014) 
5. R&D Intensity A count of the number of 4- 
digit SIC codes in which the 
parent company was operating 
in the year of investment 
(Hennart & Park, 1993;  
Dow & Larimo, 2011) 
6. Product 
Diversification 
A four-category classification 
of industry level research and 
development intensity based 
on 4-digit SIC codes using their 
associated value-added figures 
(High technology = 4; 
Medium-High technology = 3; 
Medium-Low technology = 2; 
Low technology = 1) 
(Hennart & Park, 1993;  
Dow & Larimo, 2011) 
7. Number of foreign 
countries 
Number of foreign countries 
that MNEs have their 
subsidiaries during the years 
Slangen & Hennart 
(2008) 
8. Years of 
international 
experience 
Number of years that MNEs 
have operated their activities 
abroad 
Tan & Sousa (2019) 
9. Cultural Friction Luo & Shenkar’ (2011) friction 
concept with Hofsted’s 6- 
dimension framework 
Luo & Shenkar (2011); 
Li et al. (2019); Singh 
et al. (2019) 
10. Population of 
host country 
Log of population at entry time (Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Lu, 
Liu, Wright, & 
Filatotchev, 2014) 
11. Birth rate of host 
country 
Birth rate of host country at 
entry time 
Berry et al. (2010); 
Pattnaik & Lee (2014); 
12. Literacy rate of 
host country 
The percent adult literacy rate 
of host country 
(Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Oh 
& Oetzel, 2011) 
13. EU membership A dummy for membership in 
the European Union of host 
country 
(Oetzel & Oh, 2014;  
Sun, Wang, & Luo, 2018) 




Ernst and Young (EY), and 
Trading Economics 
(Farah, Elias, 
Chakravarty, & Beamish, 
2021) 
15. WOS 1 for foreign subsidiaries with 
over 95 percent of equity, 
otherwise 0 
Hennart, Kim & Zeng, 




Differences in income, 
inflation, export and import 
turnover between countries 
Berry et al. (2010); 
Pattnaik & Lee (2014); 
Kang et al. (2017) 
17. Political distance Differences in policy-making 
uncertainty, democratic 
character, size of the state, 
member of WTO and regional 
trade agreement between 
countries 
Berry et al. (2010); 
Pattnaik & Lee (2014); 
Kang et al. (2017) 
18. Friction measure Luo and Shenkar (2011) 
formula with economic and 
political distance 
Luo & Shenkar (2011); 
Li et al. (2019); Singh 
et al. (2019) 
10. Economic 
friction 
Accessing the differences in 
income, inflation, export and 
import turnover between 
countries by applying friction ( 
Luo & Shenkar, 2011) 
(Östermark, 1998;  
Dharmapala, 2014) 
20. Political friction Accessing the differences in 
policy-making uncertainty,  
Table 3 (continued ) 
Variables Definitions and measures References 
democratic character, size of 
the state, member of WTO and 
regional trade agreement 
between countries by applying 
friction (Luo & Shenkar, 2011). 
(Walgrave & 
Nuytemans, 2009; Xu, 
Xu, & Yuan, 2013)  
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than IJVs. This finding is consistent with previous studies in the FD 
literature (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Tsang & Yip, 2007; Demirbag et al., 2011; 
Song & Lee, 2017). Nevertheless, interacting effects between EF and IJV 
are not significant in Models 7 and 8. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is not sup-
ported. We followed the same path to examine Hypothesis 4, adding the 
interaction terms between WOS and PF in Models 9–12. The terms 
remain statistically non-significant in those models. Therefore, Hy-
pothesis 4 is not supported. In sum, our results show that while WOS 
decreases foreign divestment probability, it does not moderate the in-
fluence of EF and PF on foreign divestment propensity. 
We propose two critical explanations for the non-significant effect of 
ownership levels on the friction–foreign divestment relationship. First, 
Gaur & Lu (2007) confirmed that compared with normative differences 
(i.e., informal, cultural), regulative differences (i.e., economic, political) 
are more clearly stated and easier to comprehend, regardless of 
ownership levels. Hence, we suggest that MNEs do not need to set a 
specific mode to enter countries with larger differences in regulative 
institutions. Second, Luo & Shenkar (2011) proposed that levels of 
cultural friction may be different with or without considering organi-
zational culture, which differs for WOSs and IJVs. Nevertheless, this is 
less likely to involve EF and PF, since organizations seem not to have 
their own organizational economic or political institutions. Accordingly, 
it is less likely that WOSs and IJVs involve different levels of EF and PF. 
4.1. Post-hoc test 
We conducted several robustness tests to consolidate our findings. 
First, looking to compare the distance and friction concepts when 
measuring ED and PD levels, we replicated our main models using the 
Mahalanobis distance concept in place of friction. As such, in each 
instance, we used the standard ED and PD metrics in place of the EF and 
PF metrics. The results are presented in Models 13–16 shown in Table 6. 
We found that ED has a significant negative effect on foreign divestment 
(Model 13), while the squared term of this variable is not statistically 
significant (Model 14). Hence, in line with Tsang & Yip (2007), and 
Demirbag et al. (2011), we confirm that ED decreases divestment 
probability. Further, we plotted the relationship between ED and 
divestment probability in Fig. 4. Similarly, we replaced PF with PD in 
Models 15–16. Notably, PD is non-significant in both models. This 
interesting result shows that when operating in countries with higher 
levels of national political difference (i.e., PD) without engaging in any 
political interaction, foreign firms are less likely influenced by political 
differences. While this finding is consistent with Meschi & Riccio (2008), 
and (Liu & Li, 2020), we highlight that friction is superior to distance in 
evaluating ED and PD effects, because it reflects the influence of firm 
interaction even when national differences (i.e., PD) are not relevant. 
Moreover, we plotted the relationship between EF and the hazard 
ratio of divestment with the baseline of the survival model (h0), to 
describe in Fig. 5 the effect of EF on divestment probability, accounting 
for time perspective. As such, Fig. 5 includes three dimensions – eco-
nomic friction, subsidiary hazard ratio, subsidiary age – and depicts a 
relationship that is initially negative, then positive as EF increases. The 
U-curve is consistent with differing levels of divestment probability over 
time. 
Next, we applied discrete time logit models which are used in the FD 
literature (Delios & Beamish, 2004). We find that the results, reported in 
Table 7, are largely consistent. Furthermore, as WOS is categorized at 
95% level in the main tests, we followed Dhanaraj & Beamish (2004), 
and Papyrina (2007), and recategorized ownership levels at 80%. Pre-
cisely, we recoded the WOS variable to show any investment that has 
ownership levels higher than or equal to 80% as 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Then, we re-ran Models 6–12 to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. The results, 
reported in Table 8, are still robust, meaning that WOS, while it de-
creases the likelihood of divestment, does not moderate the effect of EF 
and PF on foreign divestment probability. Finally, we examined the 


































































































   
   
   
   

























   
   
   
   
























   
   
   
   




























   
   
   

































   
   
   









































   
   
   












































   
   




















































   
   
















































   
   
























































   



























































   
































































   
























































































































































































































































































































































































































Survival analysis of the foreign divestment probability for main hypotheses.  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 








































































4. R&D Intensity 0.248 (0.168) 0.217 (0.169) 0.216 (0.169) 0.235 
(0.169) 
0.235 (0.169) 0.200 (0.169) 0.200 
(0.169) 
0.199 (0.170) 0.220 
(0.169) 
0.221 (0.169) 0.221 (0.169) 0.221 (0.169) 
























6. Number of foreign 
countries 
0.018 (0.015) 0.020 (0.015) 0.018 (0.015) 0.024 
(0.015) 
0.024 (0.015) 0.020 (0.015) 0.019 
(0.015) 
0.019 (0.015) 0.026 
(0.015) 
0.026 (0.015) 0.026 (0.016) 0.026 (0.015) 
































































































































12. EU membership 0.025 (0.174) 0.198 (0.184) 0.236 (0.185) 0.022 
(0.175) 
0.023 (0.175) 0.181 (0.186) 0.179 
(0.186) 
0.185 (0.186) 0.089 
(0.177) 
0.067 (0.177) 0.067 (0.177) 0.065 (0.177) 
13. Host Country 


























14. Economic Friction  − 1.079*** 
(0.308) 
− 2.097*** 






(0.780)     
15. Economic Friction 
Square   
1.334** 






(0.742)     
16. Political Friction    1.043*** 
(0.285) 
− 1.299 









17. Political Friction 
Square     
0.127 (0.156)    0.112 
(0.154) 
0.073 (0.146) 0.070 (0.161)  














19. Economic Friction ×
WOS       
0.304 
(0.437) 
0.826 (0.852)     
20. Economic Friction 
Square × WOS        
− 0.621 
(0.852)     
21. Political Friction ×
WOS          
0.629 (0.432) 0.035 (4.290) 0.660 (0.429) 
22. Political Friction 
Square × WOS           
0.033 (0.238)  
Log-likelihood − 4297.106 − 4231.335 − 4227.327 − 4232.66 − 4232.211 − 4223.842 − 4223.33 − 4222.942 − 4228.47 − 4227.522 − 4227.497 − 4227.683 
AIC 2551.44 2532.02 2536.13 2534.79 2531.17 2540.05 2538.54 2537.04 2357.44 2537.60 2535.61 2539.45 
Number of observations 31,352 30,985 30,985 30,881 30,881 30,985 30,985 30,985 30,881 30,881 30,881 30,881 
Number of divestments 1042 1029 1029 1030 1030 1029 1029 1029 1030 1030 1030 1030 
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses, *** p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05; + p-value < 0.1, fixed-effect for parent firms, years and industry. 
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development levels based on the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) categories. The results are robust in the 
subsamples. For brevity, we do not report these results. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
IB scholars recognize the influence of economic and political dif-
ferences on FD probability. Nevertheless, the extensive discussion on the 
negative effects of the differences, combined with the oversimplification 
of distance-based measurement, has led to insufficient knowledge on the 
multifaceted effects of economic and political differences (Gaur & Lu, 
2007; Jackson and Deeg, 2008) Aguilera & Grøgaard, 2019; Graafland & 
Noorderhaven, 2020). This research broadens our mindset regarding the 
effect of EF and PF, by elaborating on the POS lens. We further examine 
the role of ownership levels in modifying the friction–divestment rela-
tionship. Based on previous reviews on foreign divestment (Arte & 
Larimo, 2019; Coudounaris et al., 2020; Schmid & Morschett, 2020), our 
model also controlled for other known effects regularly included in FDIs 
and FD analysis. 
5.1. Theoretical contributions 
Exploring the influence of economic and political differences on 
foreign divestment, our study contributes to the extant literature in 
several ways. First, using the POS lens, our study reshapes the traditional 
perspective of institutional theory concerning the negative outcomes of 
institutional differences on MNE internationalization and foreign 
divestment. Our tenet is that each institution imposes different con-
straints on foreign subsidiaries and provides them with different re-
sources, depending on the unique nature of the specific institutional 
environment, and the interaction levels that the subsidiaries encounter 
with the different context. Precisely, our study found that economic and 
political friction have different impacts on FD probability. 
On the one hand, we confirmed that economic friction has a curvi-
linear effect on foreign divestment probability. This finding is consistent 
with the previous studies on the impacts of economic differences (Gaur 
& Lu, 2007; Wu, 2013; Fortwengel, 2017). More precisely, we find that 
at lower levels, economic friction is negatively associated with divest-
ment probability. Economic arbitrage is a benefit that outweighs initial 
costs (Evans & Mavondo, 2002; Demirbag et al., 2011). Foreign 
Fig. 2. The relationship between economic friction vs. economic distance and 
the log-likelihood of divestment probability. 
Fig. 3. The relationship between political friction and the log-likelihood of 
divestment probability. 
Table 6 
Replicating the results using distance approach in place of friction.  
Variables Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 















































































































13. Host Country 
Corporate 














(0.600)   
15. Economic 
Distance Square  
0.832 
(0.622)   
16. Political 






Distance Square    
− 0.002 
(0.016) 
Log-likelihood − 4232.349 − 4232.493 − 4296.431 − 4296.391 
AIC 2528.68 2528.41 2550.48 2548.50 
Number of 
observations 
31,002 31,002 31,352 31,352 
Number of 
divestments 
1029 1029 1042 1042 
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses, *** p-value < 0.001; ** p-value <
0.01; * p-value < 0.05; + p-value < 0.1, fixed-effect for parent firms, years and 
industry. 
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subsidiaries could also overcome low levels of economic friction by 
generating well-prepared strategic plans, learning from accumulated 
experience, and exploiting local economic resources (Gaur & Lu, 2007). 
However, the positive outcome of economic friction is not stable, and 
once a certain threshold has been reached, the relationship is reversed. 
We argue that at higher levels of friction, economic arbitrage is 
narrower (Gaur & Lu, 2007). In addition, prepared plans may not be 
efficient, due to the lack of suitability and sufficiency of practical 
experience and knowledge about similar situations, while using stereo-
types could lead foreign subsidiaries to failures in compromising on 
local legitimacy requirements (Zeng et al., 2013; Popli et al., 2016). 
Higher levels of economic interaction could also trigger more conflicts, 
and increase ex-ante and ex-post costs and risks (Malhotra et al., 2011). 
Hence, once a certain threshold has been reached, higher EF levels in-
crease the divestment probability. 
On the other hand, our empirical results confirmed the positive 
relationship between political friction and FD probability. In contrast to 
other institutions, political friction introduces serious impediments to 
foreign subsidiaries to comprehend and compromise (Dhanaraj & 
Beamish, 2009; Berry et al., 2010; Chao & Kumar, 2010). Political 
friction also increases conflict, leading foreign subsidiaries to fail in 
achieving legitimacy (Pattnaik & Lee, 2014; Kang et al., 2017). In 
addition, political friction results in more constraints on foreign sub-
sidiaries, since host governments often hold greater powers (Cordero & 
Miller, 2019; Sartor & Beamish, 2020). Furthermore, MNEs and their 
foreign subsidiaries are more cautious about political benefits, espe-
cially when they need to deal with local governments to gain such 
benefits (Sartor & Beamish, 2020; Witte et al., 2020). Importantly, our 
findings confirm an implied assumption in the FD literature that for 
extant foreign subsidiaries, political differences and any favorable 
change in the political system are unlikely to create new opportunities to 
enhance their survival (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009). 
Second, our study extends friction’s application, and proves the 
validity of the concept in assessing the effect of economic and political 
differences. Elaborating on criticisms of the distance concept in terms of 
measuring differences (Shenkar, 2001; Luo & Shenkar, 2011), we apply 
friction to measure the economic and political differences. Our post hoc 
results further confirm that compared to the friction metric, using dis-
tance to measure the differences delivers less meaningful findings. 
Hence, we highlight the importance of considering firms’ specific con-
ditions in evaluating the influence of economic and political differences. 
Fig. 4. The relationship between economic friction vs. economic distance and 
the log-likelihood of divestment probability. 
Fig. 5. The relationship between economic friction and the log-likelihood of divestment probability with different subsidiary age.  
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Third, we explore the role of ownership levels, and show that higher 
levels (WOS) decrease FD probability. Notably, we found that ownership 
levels do not significantly change the effects of economic and political 
friction on foreign divestment. This finding is interesting, albeit incon-
sistent with our expectations. We argue that compared to normative and 
cognitive (i.e., informal, cultural) differences, regulative (i.e., economic 
and political) differences are stated more clearly and, thus, foreign 
subsidiaries find them easier to overcome due to the availability of 
secondary information (Gaur & Lu, 2007). We therefore encourage IB 
scholars to delve deeper into the effect of ownership levels. 
5.2. Managerial implications 
The managerial implications of our findings are straightforward. 
First, by elaborating on the different natures of economic and political 
differences, we stress that MNE managers should be aware of the dif-
ferences between institutional environments. This awareness would 
help MNEs generate better strategies to deal with specific institutional 
differences. Second, we encourage managers to carefully consider the 
combined effect of national differences and specific firms’ interactions, 
that is, friction rather than distance. Furthermore, we urge MNE man-
agers to nurture moderate levels of economic friction, since our findings 
indicate this friction has a U-shaped effect on FD probability. We also 
encourage managers to maintain low political friction, because it is 
positively associated with divestment probability. 
Since we find that ownership levels do not moderate the friction- 
divestment relationship, we encourage MNEs to build on other strate-
gies focused on organizational prescription. That is, hiring experienced 
expatriates, managing levels of communication between headquarters 
and subsidiaries, and among subsidiaries, as well as educating personnel 
about local knowledge and social norms, in order to modify the effects of 
economic and political friction (Luo & Shenkar, 2011). These strategies 
may provide sufficient tools to alleviate friction (Luo & Shenkar, 2011; 
Sartor & Beamish, 2020). 
Table 7 
Discrete analysis of the foreign divestment probability for main hypotheses.  
Variables Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 




































































































































































































































13. Host Country 




















14. Economic Friction  − 1.079*** 
(0.308) 
− 2.097*** 




(0.780)   
15. Economic Friction 
Square   
1.334** 




(0.742)   
16. Political Friction    1.043*** 
(0.285) 
− 1.299 





17. Political Friction 
Square     
0.127 
(0.156)   
0.112 
(0.154)  








19. Economic Friction 
× WOS       
0.826 
(0.852)   
20. Economic Friction 
Square × WOS       
− 0.621 
(0.852)   
21. Political Friction ×
WOS         
0.660 
(0.429) 
22. Political Friction 
Square × WOS          
Log-likelihood − 4297.106 − 4231.335 − 4227.327 − 4232.66 − 4232.211 − 4223.842 − 4222.942 − 4228.47 − 4227.683 
AIC 2551.44 2532.02 2536.13 2534.79 2531.17 2540.05 2537.04 2357.44 2539.45 
Number of 
observations 
31,352 30,985 30,985 30,881 30,881 30,985 30,985 30,881 30,881 
Number of 
divestments 
1042 1029 1029 1030 1030 1029 1029 1030 1030 
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses, *** p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05; + p-value < 0.1, fixed-effect for parent firms, years and 
industry. 
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5.3. Limitations and future research 
Our study is not without its limitations. First, it focuses solely on the 
effects of economic and political friction. This limited range of di-
mensions could be addressed by examining the effects of other di-
mensions, namely, knowledge, financial, administrative, or 
demonstrative institutions, since MNEs communicate different aspects 
of the institutional environments in host countries (i.e., Pattnaik & Lee, 
2014; Kang et al., 2017). Considering these factors is also important 
because our study confirms that different institutional environments 
have different effects on foreign divestments. Furthermore, with respect 
to institutional friction, we encourage future research to examine its 
influences on escape-based FDI (Witt & Lewin, 2007). This could 
develop our nuanced understanding of why firms decide to exit their 
home country. 
Second, in line with Zimmerman & Zeitz (2002), and Jackson & Deeg 
(2008), we encourage future researchers to examine a specific mix of 
relevant institutional forces, as well as the interactions among institu-
tional dimensions. For instance, future studies could examine the com-
bined effect of cultural, economic and political friction, among others, 
on firms’ internationalization, and particularly on foreign divestments. 
This could be extremely fruitful, as foreign subsidiaries often encounter 
friction with several institutions at divergent degrees simultaneously 
(Graafland & Noorderhaven, 2020). 
Third, Luo & Shenkar (2011) proposed using friction to measure the 
influence of institutional differences in multilevel analysis, that is, at 
national, firm and individual levels. Our study examines the effect of 
economic and political friction defined at the national and firm levels. 
We acknowledge that with different levels of interaction at the indi-
vidual level, that is, chief executives, top management, and expatriates 
(Sartor & Beamish, 2020), foreign subsidiaries may perceive and be 
influenced differently by institutional differences. As such, we 
encourage future research to focus on the effect of institutional 
differences at the individual level. IB researchers have further confirmed 
that MNEs follow regional expansion, rather than national borders, that 
is, economic cluster, cultural cluster, and geographic cluster (Arregle, 
Beamish & Hébert, 2009; Arregle, Miller, Hitt & Beamish, 2013; Dem-
irbag, Glaister & Sengupta, 2020). Hence, we urge researchers to 
develop the friction concept at cluster levels, thus constituting the 
generalization of this concept in the IB literature. Furthermore, as there 
are several ways to access levels of firm interactions (i.e., Shenkar, 
Tallman, Wang & Wu, 2020), we encourage future studies to widely 
examine new measures of firm interaction, as an interesting way to 
further develop the friction metrics. 
Our findings may also have limited generalizability, since they are 
based on a sample of Finnish MNEs and their foreign subsidiaries. While 
we claim that our friction concept, combining both national distance 
and firm interaction, could compensate for the single-country related 
issue, we urge future research to draw on diverse settings, including 
multiple home and host countries (Brouthers et al., 2016), when 
investigating the influences of economic and political friction. Further-
more, although our research does not provide support for the moder-
ating effect of equity ownership levels, we acknowledge the significant 
effect of ownership strategies on different levels of communication, 
power structures, and staff assignments (Luo & Shenkar, 2011). This 
organizational prescription, a so-called “black box”, has seldom been 
examined (Koch et al., 2016; Singh et al., 2019). However, due to the 
unavailability of data on staff or managerial communication, we could 
not examine the effects. In closing, due to a lack of information on 
subsidiary profitability or performance, and exit barriers, among others 
(Arte & Larimo, 2019; Schmid & Morschett, 2020), we could not control 
for these variables in our models. Therefore, we propose that future 
research should. 
Table 8 
Checking moderating effect of WOS, replacing 95% by 80%.  
Variables Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 




























3. Unrelatedness 0.103+ (0.058) 0.106+ (0.058) 0.107+ (0.058) 0.095+ (0.058) 0.094+ (0.058) 0.094+ (0.058) 0.094+ (0.058) 
4. R&D Intensity 0.211 (0.169) 0.215 (0.169) 0.216 (0.169) 0.230 (0.169) 0.226 (0.169) 0.226 (0.169) 0.226 (0.169) 
5. Product Diversification 0.073*** (0.012) 0.074*** (0.012) 0.074*** (0.012) 0.073*** (0.012) 0.073*** (0.012) 0.073*** (0.012) 0.073*** (0.012) 
6. Number of foreign countries 0.020 (0.015) 0.020 (0.015) 0.020 (0.015) 0.027 (0.015) 0.026 (0.015) 0.026 (0.015) 0.026 (0.015) 
7. Years of international experience 0.176*** (0.019) 0.177*** (0.019) 0.177*** (0.019) 0.178*** (0.019) 0.178*** (0.019) 0.178*** (0.019) 0.178*** (0.019) 
8. Cultural Friction − 0.159 (0.157) − 0.171 (0.161) − 0.166 (0.159) − 0.024 (0.149) − 0.007 (0.141) − 0.011 (0.148) − 0.020 (0.113) 
9. Population of host country − 0.072 (0.264) − 0.068 (0.265) − 0.070 (0.265) − 0.057 (0.274) − 0.052 (0.274) − 0.050 (0.274) − 0.052 (0.274) 
10. Birth rate of host country 0.531** (0.188) 0.539** (0.188) 0.540** (0.188) 0.586** (0.192) 0.580** (0.192) 0.580** (0.192) 0.578** (0.192) 
11. Literacy rate of host country 0.345** (0.108) 0.344** (0.108) 0.341** (0.108) 0.351** (0.108) 0.352** (0.108) 0.352** (0.108) 0.351** (0.108) 
12. EU membership 0.181 (0.186) 0.178 (0.186) 0.183 (0.186) 0.089 (0.177) 0.072 (0.177) 0.072 (0.178) 0.070 (0.178) 
13. Host Country Corporate Income 
Tax Rate 
0.019*** (0.006) 0.018*** (0.006) 0.018*** (0.006) 0.028*** (0.006) 0.028*** (0.006) 0.028*** (0.005) 0.028*** (0.005) 





(0.849)     
15. Economic Friction Square 1.357** (0.439) 1.362** (0.427) 1.799** (0.819)     
16. Political Friction    − 1.030 (2.881) − 0.913 (2.615) − 0.788 (3.192) 0.792 (0.393) 
17. Political Friction Square    0.115 (0.154) 0.094 (0.144) 0.086 (0.177)  








− 0.419 (0.406) − 0.218 (1.680) − 4.511 (4.118) 
19. Economic Friction × WOS  0.467 (0.462) 0.921 (0.905)     
20. Economic Friction Square × WOS   − 0.538 (0.902)    0.462 (0.442) 
21. Political Friction × WOS     0.427 (0.436) − 0.026 (3.719)  
22. Political Friction Square × WOS      0.026 (0.208)  
Log-likelihood − 4224.722 − 4223.696 − 4223.303 − 5059.158 − 5058.968 − 4228.944 − 4229.175 
AIC 2539.20 2538.27 2536.60 2926.59 2924.89 2533.60 2537.35 
Number of observations 30,985 30,985 30,985 30,881 30,881 30,881 30,881 
Number of divestments 1029 1029 1029 1030 1030 1030 1030 
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses, *** p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05; + p-value < 0.1, fixed-effect for parent firms, years and 
industry. 
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